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Abstract  
This study is the first attempt to examine the determinants of expenditure decentralization 
at sub-provincial levels in China. The Chinese central government gives detailed 
guidelines to local governments on public finance, but, ironically, their expenditure 
assignment is far from being well-regulated. Differences in fiscal decentralization on the 
expenditure side are enormous among local governments. Employing a panel dataset of 
1995-2006, we provide empirical evidence that transfer dependency negatively affects 
expenditure decentralization in Chinese local governments. It suggests that intermediate 
governments, i.e. provincial governments, may have “grabbed” central grants for 
self-interests.  
 
Keywords: decentralization, local government, intergovernmental relations, fiscal 
transfers, China 
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Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This paper aims to explore the determinants of expenditure decentralization in China, 
the world’s third largest country by total land area, and to examine their broad policy 
implications. Though China is a constitutionally unitary country, fiscal 
decentralization at sub-provincial levels varies tremendously across provinces, 
especially on the expenditure side. While there is a growing literature on the factors 
that explain the extent of fiscal decentralization, we still know little about what drives 
fiscal decentralization in different places (Bodman & Hodge, 2010). Taking advantage 
of the substantial variation in sub-provincial expenditure decentralization in China, 
this study contributes to this body of literature by testing hypotheses concerning some 
potential determinants of fiscal decentralization reported in the literature. 
Investigating the drivers of fiscal decentralization should be meaningful as most 
studies evaluate the effects of fiscal decentralization without looking into its 
complexities. Without an in-depth understanding of fiscal decentralization per se, it 
often runs the risk of overshooting when making conclusions about the benefits or 
perils of decentralization.  
 
Decentralization is “often viewed as a shift of authority towards local governments 
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and away from central governments, with total government authority over society and 
economy imagined as fixed” (Rodden, 2004, p. 482). Fiscal decentralization, more 
often than not, referring to the shift of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of 
government, is fundamental to public governance in reality. Studies on fiscal 
decentralization have been burgeoning in the international community; however, the 
drivers of fiscal decentralization have remained little known thus far. Early literature 
on fiscal decentralization focuses on power assignment in the public sector (Tiebout, 
1956; Oates, 2005). The bulk of the literature in recent decades has investigated the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on public governance (Prud’homme, 1995; Rodden 
& Wibbels, 2002; Uchimura & Jütting, 2009). The drivers of decentralization have 
been largely overlooked, except for some recent efforts such as Bodman and Hodge 
(2010) and Panizza (1999). Compared with studies on the impacts of fiscal 
decentralization, untangling factors underpinning fiscal decentralization will be 
instrumental in generating a better understanding of the complexity and dynamics of 
decentralization in different politico-economic backgrounds. In many cases, fiscal 
decentralization per se is not the problem, but decentralization may have been 
implemented in an incompatible environment. When the drivers of 
decentralization/centralization are discovered, the evaluation of 
decentralization/centralization will be more pointed and the nuanced side of 
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central-local relationship will be more revealing.   
 
This study will investigate the regional variation of fiscal decentralization, 
specifically on the expenditure side, in China. Fiscal decentralization at 
sub-provincial levels in China is seriously under-explored in the literature. Though the 
literature on the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic development and 
public governance has burgeoned in recent years (for example Uchimura & Jütting, 
2009), the investigation into the determinants of fiscal decentralization is rare. As the 
geographic areas of many Chinese provinces are equal to those of European countries, 
diversities between provinces in political, economic and social aspects are 
astonishingly large. Sub-provincial decentralization in China is much more diversified 
than that in many other countries (Dollar & Hofman, 2008). Exploring fiscal 
decentralization, Chinese style, therefore, will potentially generate broad implications 
for other countries. 
 
The Chinese central government does not exert a tight control over sub-provincial 
expenditure decentralization. Provincial governments in China enjoy substantial 
discretion in this regard. According to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the China Statistical Yearbook (2009), subnational governments 
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refer to 31 provincial governments, 333 prefectural governments, 2,859 county 
governments, and 40,828 township governments (sub-provincial governments include 
prefectural, county and township governments). Local governments provide the bulk 
of public services in China wherein 70 percent of public money has been spent at the 
subnational level with more than 55 percent being spent by sub-provincial 
governments (World Bank, 2002). Due to the efforts to build a service-oriented 
government in recent years, local governments will take up more responsibilities for 
the provision of public services over time in China. Expenditure assignment for local 
governments is nonetheless far from being well-regulated (see also Martinez-Vazquez 
& Qiao, 2011). The State Council (2002), the top administrative body of the central 
government in China, provides regulations on local fiscal decentralization, paying 
most attention to the revenue side of fiscal decentralization while the regulations on 
the expenditure side have been nearly left blank. Variations in fiscal decentralization 
on the expenditure side are enormous across localities in China. For example, 
sub-provincial governments spent 85.32 percent of public money in Guangdong 
Province while only 53.72 percent was expended in Qinghai Province between 1995 
and 2006 (see The Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, Cities, and 
Counties, 1996-2007). Thus we pose our research question for this analysis: What 
drives the variation in sub-provincial expenditure decentralization in China? Based on 
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the empirical results of our analysis, we attempt to draw policy implications for the 
improvement of the intergovernmental fiscal system in China. 
 
In general, our empirical analysis confirms a negative relationship between transfer 
dependency (central transfer as a share of local expenditure) and fiscal 
decentralization in the Chinese context. Regions with a greater transfer-dependency 
tend to have a higher centralization of expenditure within provinces, ceteris paribus. 
As observers have long suspected that local governments play fiscal games with 
national governments in order to gain more grants in some countries (Gimpelson & 
Treisman, 2002), the results of our analysis also suggest a predatory role played by 
local governments in China. In addition, our study provides suggestive evidence that 
both population density and foreign direct investment (FDI) have negative influences 
over expenditure decentralization while economic development adds almost nothing 
to the explanatory power of our models for expenditure decentralization.  
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theories 
and empirical evidence of the potential determinants of fiscal decentralization with an 
emphasis on the relationship between transfer dependency and expenditure 
decentralization. Section 3 presents data, model specification and estimation 
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methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical results of our analysis while section 5 
offers a discussion of them. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION  
Here we summarize the factors that have been used to explain fiscal decentralization 
in the literature, much of which is drawn from cross-national evidence. These 
potential determinants of fiscal decentralization identified in the literature are 
employed as the basis of our theoretical framework for this study. 
 
2.1 Explaining the tie between transfer dependency and fiscal decentralization  
The effects of fiscal transfers from the federal government (or the central government 
in countries like China) to local governments on local spending have been 
investigated extensively (for example the flypaper effect; see Bailey and Connolly 
(1998)). Nevertheless, the majority of the literature is linked with the theories and 
hypotheses (such as the median voter hypothesis) developed against a context of 
electoral politics. The impact of transfers from higher authorities on fiscal 
decentralization remains largely underexplored.  
 
In some countries, the national government cannot channel grants to grassroots 
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governments but have to go through intermediate governments according to the 
Constitutions (Hernández-Trillo & Jarillo-Rabling, 2008). Though it is not the case in 
China institutionally, the Chinese government has adopted a de facto system in 
practice. That is, central grants have to go through provincial governments before 
reaching prefectural and county governments. There is a risk that provincial 
governments may retain the intergovernmental transfers for their self-interests. Thus, 
the relationship between transfer dependency and expenditure decentralization could 
be either negative or positive, depending on the role and function of intermediate 
governments who are responsible for transmitting central grants to local governments.  
 
Provincial governments in China, according to the State Council (2002), should hold 
back their own spending and augment central transfers to sub-provincial governments. 
It means that provincial governments are obligated to not only pass on central 
transfers to sub-provincial governments but also relinquish some parts of their own 
financial resources to lower levels of government as the latter provides the bulk of 
public services to citizens. In reality, no evidence suggests that provincial 
governments channel much of their own resources (in addition to transfers from the 
central government) to sub-provincial governments. The World Bank (2007) aptly 
points out that it “appears to be that a typical province makes little, if any, 
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contribution to intergovernmental transfers to lower levels that are designed to 
equalize fiscal capacities” (p.53). Worse still, evidence here and elsewhere suggests 
that provincial governments may capture some central transfers, which are supposed 
to be used to fund local projects and the provision of public services. Therefore, we 
should pay great attention to the role of provincial governments in the 
intergovernmental transfer system.     
 
The hypothesis about a negative relationship between transfer dependency and fiscal 
decentralization has been confirmed in a study using the case of Russia. Freinkman 
and Plekhanov (2009) find that those transfer-dependent regions tend to have greater 
fiscal centralization, other things being equal. As central grants flow through regional 
governments, it would be possible for them to spend the transfers rather than 
distribute them to lower-level governments.
1
 When controlling for all other regional 
characteristics, higher transfer dependency is found to be associated with lower fiscal 
decentralization.   
 
Cross-national evidence, however, suggests that a greater amount of fiscal transfers 
tend to encourage more local expenditure as soft budget constraints arise (Bodman & 
Hodge, 2010; Letelier S., 2005).
2
 Higher transfer dependency thus is associated with 
 9 
 
greater fiscal decentralization. Another line of inference also supports the positive 
relationship between transfer dependency and fiscal decentralization. As 
intergovernmental transfers partially serve to compensate local governments for their 
implementation of central mandates, swelling transfers to local governments mean 
that local governments bear more responsibility for spending; thereby the share of 
local spending increases consequently. In sum, the positive relationship between 
transfer dependency and fiscal decentralization has been established by several 
cross-national studies for developed countries (Kee, 1977; Letelier S., 2005).  
 
2.2 Other drivers of fiscal decentralization 
In addition to the main hypothesis discussed above, we examine the following factors 
that affect the levels of fiscal decentralization.   
 
Economic development. There are two contrasting arguments related to the role of 
economic development on fiscal decentralization. One the one hand, economic 
development is expected to be positively related to fiscal decentralization. The 
majority of basic public services are provided by local governments in countries like 
China. Some argue that expenditure at the local level will increase as the provision of 
basic public goods will be expensive when wealthier citizens demand diversified and 
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more expensive public services (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003; Tanzi, 2000; 
Wheare, 1964). On the other hand, economic development may be negatively related 
to fiscal decentralization. As suggested by Letelier S. (2005), an increasing emphasis 
will be given to income redistribution when a locality or country becomes more 
affluent; consequently, more central coordination and central investment will be 
demanded gradually. Expenditure by higher authorities may thus grow faster than that 
at the local level.  
 
Empirical evidence for the effect of economic development on fiscal decentralization 
is mixed. Early studies on this issue find that per capita income of a given country is 
significantly and positively related to fiscal decentralization (Kee, 1977; Panizza, 
1999). Recent research has found some new evidence on the different effects of 
economic development in developed and developing economies (Bodman & Hodge, 
2010; Letelier S., 2005), namely a positive relationship in high-income countries and 
a negative one in low-income countries. 
 
Population size and population density. Litvack and Oates (1971) suggest that social 
congestion will increase when population size grows. Provided that local 
governments offer the majority of public services to citizens, the rising cost of 
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congestion will increase the share of local expenditure in total government spending 
(Bodman & Hodge, 2010). A higher population density is also likely to be associated 
with lower cost of public services due to increasing returns to scale in the provision of 
public services. A lower population density increases the cost of public services 
provided that other conditions remain constant.  
 
Previous studies generally indicate a positive relationship between population size and 
fiscal decentralization, and a negative one between population density and fiscal 
decentralization (Bodman & Hodge, 2010; Cerniglia, 2003; Freinkman & Plekhanov, 
2005). Therefore, we expect a larger population size and a lower density to be 
associated with a higher fiscal decentralization in local China.  
 
Openness to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Compared with the factors of 
income and population size, both openness to trade and FDI garner much less 
attention in the literature. Kimakova (2009) and Rodrik (1998) argue that a 
trade-oriented economy is vulnerable to outside economic shocks; thus the economic 
coordination by the central government becomes imperative in an open economy. 
Integration into the international market thus improves fiscal centralization, all other 
things being held constant (Garrett & Rodden, 2003; Stegarescu, 2009).  
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The relationship between trade openness and fiscal decentralization has been tested 
largely with cross-national datasets. Given the fact that FDI represents the openness 
of an economy, what would be the impact of both trade and economic openness on 
fiscal decentralization in a domestic circumstance? A burgeoning scholarship 
confirms that both trade openness and FDI can serve as a device to improve good 
governance (see Malesky, 2004; Wu & Lin, 2012). Foreigners, especially those from 
developed countries purchasing goods or investing in developing countries, may push 
recipient governments to improve their public services or “leak” some practical hints 
on good public governance to destinations of trade and investment. As decentralized 
governance has been embraced as an effective instrument to improve public 
governance in many industrialized countries, our assumption is that both openness to 
trade and FDI may enhance the level of fiscal decentralization in developing countries 
like China through policy imitation and diffusion. We thus hypothesize that both 
openness to trade and FDI have positive impacts on fiscal decentralization in local 
China.   
3. DATA, MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
We conduct our empirical analysis using a panel dataset from 30 provinces in China 
between 1995 and 2006 (Tibet is excluded due to data unavailability). Data used for 
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this analysis were taken from the Compendium of Fiscal Statistics for All Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties (Quanguo dishixian caizheng tongji ziliao), the Finance 
Yearbook of China (zhongguo caizheng nianjian), and China Compendium of 
Statistics in 1949-2008. 
  
Definition of variables  
Based on the literature reviewed in the previous section, we specify our empirical 
models, including the dependent variable and independent variables, for this analysis. 
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable, fiscal decentralization, is measured as sub-provincial 
expenditure as the share of total provincial and sub-provincial expenditure. This 
means that prefectural, county and township public expenditure is summed up, and 
then the number is divided by total provincial and sub-provincial government 
spending in a given province. Measuring fiscal decentralization is a formidable 
challenge that attracts the bulk of scholarly debate (see Yeung, 2009). Since fiscal 
decentralization is multidimensional, a single proxy can hardly capture the dynamics 
of power assignment across governments.
3
 Acknowledging the imperfection of 
measuring fiscal decentralization as expenditure shares, we nevertheless have some 
strong reasons to use sub-provincial fiscal decentralization as the dependent variable. 
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First, the measurement of fiscal decentralization tends to be more problematic in 
cross-national studies because historical and legal backgrounds of public finance are 
very different among different countries (Stegarescu, 2005). The within-country 
comparison nonetheless can avoid this problem. Though the levels of expenditure 
decentralization vary across provinces and time periods in China, decentralization is 
generally governed by the same set of legal frameworks. Second, measurement errors 
of fiscal decentralization are more problematic in models with decentralization being 
used as an independent variable. Fiscal decentralization used as a dependent variable 
instead causes less concern (Stegarescu, 2005).
4
 
  
We target the variation on the expenditure side and argue that expenditure share at the 
sub-provincial level can effectively represent fiscal decentralization in local China. As 
public spending represents the government’s involvement in society, expenditure data 
are revealing in explaining variations in local governance; policy implications drawn 
on this therefore are intriguing. In addition, the revenue side of fiscal decentralization 
is also tested, though its empirical results are not reported in this study. Policy 
implications of revenue decentralization are unclear as local governments actually 
have not been assigned the authority to borrow and to determine their tax bases and 
tax rates in China.  
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Independent variable  
Transfer dependency refers to the extent to which provincial expenditure is funded by 
central transfers. The numerator of the variable is central transfers to the provinces, 
including those for provincial, prefectural, county and township levels of government, 
while the denominator refers to spending by all of the four tiers of government within 
a province in China.
5
 It is the amount of central transfers to all tiers within a province 
divided by the expenditure by all tiers within the province. Economic Development is 
measured as real GDP per capita at the provincial level, with 1992 being used as the 
base year. The real GDP per capita is calculated as the nominal GDP per capita 
divided by provincial GDP deflator (in natural logarithm). Population density is 
measured as the number of resident population (de facto residents, changzhu renkou) 
per square kilometer of land area in a given province (in natural logarithm).
6
 
Openness to trade is measured as the share of imports plus exports (yuan) in 
provincial GDP. FDI denotes the volume of foreign direct investment (yuan) as a 
share of provincial GDP in a given province.  
 
In addition, the industrial and economic structures in a province may potentially affect 
the patterns of local spending. In some models, we add SOE employment and 
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economic structure as controls to improve the robustness of the empirical models. 
SOE employment refers to the number of state-owned enterprise employees as a share 
of the total population. Economic structure is measured as the volume of the 
secondary sector in local GDP. Table 1 provides the measurement and data sources, 
and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all of the variables used in this 
empirical analysis. 
 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Estimation methodology 
Panel data models are often estimated with either fixed effects or random effects 
models. Random effects models make the assumption that the random effects are 
uncorrelated with the random error. If this assumption is wrong, the random effects 
estimator will be inconsistent (Greene, 2002). As random effects are a more efficient 
estimator than fixed effects, we should run random effects if it is statistically 
justifiable. However, the Hausman test statistic we obtain is highly significant, 
suggesting that a fixed effects model should be adopted.  
 
To investigate the determinants of fiscal decentralization in China, first of all, we 
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estimate the following linear fixed effects model: 
Yit =a0 +Xitb +ai +g t +eit   (1) 
where Y is our dependent variable, fiscal decentralization, that is equal to the share of 
sub-provincial expenditure in total subnational expenditure for province i in year t. As 
discussed above, X is a matrix of our major independent variables, including transfer 
dependency, economic development, population density, openness to trade and FDI. 
In the model, ai  represents the province-fixed effects and g t  the year-fixed effects, 
while eit  is the random error. In addition, in order to control for the differences in 
economic and industrial structure in each province, we also estimate alternative 
models that include the two control variables – SOE employment and economic 
structure.     
 
A major challenge needed to be dealt with in estimating the empirical model is the 
potential endogeneity of the economic development variable, indicated as real GDP 
per capita. As the dependent variable, fiscal decentralization, may have an impact on 
provincial economic development,
7
 the causality may be reciprocal in the model. If 
we ignore the problem in estimation, the coefficient estimates may be biased and 
inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2006). In order to deal with the empirical challenge, we 
also run two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, using one-year and two-year lags 
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of real GDP per capita as instruments. An instrumental variable must have the 
following two properties: (1) it must be uncorrelated with the error term in the model; 
(2) it must be partially correlated with the endogenous independent variable. To use 
the lags of GDP as instruments, we assure that the time order of effect on the 
dependent variable is correct and that it is correlated with the GDP in the current 
period. We also use the Newey-West estimation procedure to deal with the problem of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. This procedure computes ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
standard errors (Newey & West, 1987).  
 
In addition, since our dependent variable, measured as the share of sub-provincial 
expenditure in total provincial expenditure, is necessarily bounded between zero and 
one, standard linear models may not provide an accurate picture of the impacts of 
some independent variables on fiscal decentralization throughout their entire 
distribution. Furthermore, such models do not ensure that the expected value falls 
between zero and one. In recent years, there has been an emerging empirical literature 
attempting to explain fractional responses (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008). 
Following the approach recently proposed for panel data in Papke and Wooldridge 
(2008), we use the method of pooled quasi-MLE (QMLE) to estimate a fractional 
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probit model in the following form: 
E(Yit | xi1, xi2,..., xiT )=f(yt + xitb + xi
_
x )   (2)  
where f  is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a normal distribution, and 
the presence of yt  indicates that we are allowing a different intercept in each year. 
We provide estimates of the partial effects averaged across the population, or the 
“average partial effects” (APEs), which are computed based on the scaled coefficients. 
The APEs are comparable to the linear model estimates. We use bootstrapping to 
obtain the bootstrap standard errors for the APEs. This approach allows for 
time-invariant unobserved effects that can be correlated with explanatory variables. 
The model is estimated assuming that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. 
We then relax the strict exogeneity assumption and treat the economic development 
variable as endogenous.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of four linear models and two fractional probit 
models. The four linear models include the baseline model with all the major 
independent variables, the model with the inclusion of two additional control 
variables and the two 2SLS models with economic development variable treated as 
endogenous. We also estimated two fractional probit models with and without the 
economic development variable being treated as endogenous.  
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The baseline model (model 1) has an R-squared of 0.52, indicating that 52 percent of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained in the empirical model. The test 
statistics for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation indicated their presence in the 
model, so we used the Newey-West estimation procedure to compute robust HAC 
standard errors.
8
 The coefficient of transfer dependency is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level; a one percentage point increase in the ratio of central transfers to 
provincial expenditure lowers the share of sub-provincial expenditure in total 
expenditure by 0.164 percentage point. In other words, an average province with 
50.69 percent in transfer dependency will have an 8.31 percentage point drop in 
expenditure decentralization, a substantial 11.82 percent drop from the average ratio 
of 70.63 percent. Economic development, or real GDP per capita, has a coefficient of 
6.421, but it is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Population density is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and a 1 percent increase in population 
density leads to a drop of 0.320 percentage point in the dependent variable. A one 
percentage point increase in the share of FDI in GDP is associated with a 0.279 
percentage point drop in the dependent variable, and the coefficient is significant at 
the 5 percent level. The share of trade in GDP has a positive coefficient, but it is not 
statistically significant.  
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In model 2, we added two control variables – the share of state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) employment in the total population and the share of secondary industry output 
in the total GDP. The inclusion of the two additional variables does not significantly 
change our empirical results. 
 
In models 3 and 4, the economic development variable is treated as endogenous,
9
 and 
the results are similar to those in models 1 and 2, having no flip of sign in coefficient 
estimates or a substantial change in the level of significance. Comparing the results in 
models 2 and 4, the coefficient on transfer dependency changes from -0.156 to -0.169. 
The coefficients of population density and share of FDI in GDP drop from -0.316 and 
-0.270 to -0.230 and -0.203, respectively. The coefficients of other variables are not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
10
  
 
The linear models reported above do not ensure that the expected value of the 
dependent variable lies on the unit interval. We used pooled QMLE to estimate two 
fractional probit models; one model (model 5) assumes that all explanatory variables 
are strictly exogenous, and the other (model 6) allows the economic development 
variable to be endogenous. In both models, we used 1,000 bootstrap replications to 
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obtain bootstrap standard errors, which are robust to general heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. The transfer dependency variable remains statistically highly 
significant in both models. Its APE estimates, -0.158 in model 5 and -0.159 in model 
6, are very similar in magnitude to the estimates of fixed effects and 2SLS models. So 
the three sets of estimates tell a consistent story: transfer dependency has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on fiscal decentralization. 
[Table 3 about here] 
5. DISCUSSION  
Our empirical study on the sub-provincial variation of expenditure decentralization 
generates the following results. First, there is a significant negative relationship 
between transfer dependency and expenditure decentralization. Second, both 
population density and the share of FDI in GDP have a significant negative effect on 
fiscal decentralization, though they lose their statistical significance in the fractional 
probit models. Third, the estimated coefficients on economic development and 
openness to trade are not statistically significant. 
 
The negative relationship between transfer dependency and expenditure 
decentralization suggests that intermediate governments-provincial governments-may 
have “grabbed” central grants for self-interests. As transfers serve to compensate local 
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efforts in providing public services and reducing regional variations in fiscal capacity, 
higher transfer dependency should be correlated with greater expenditure 
decentralization in China, other things being equal. It is, however, exactly the 
opposite in reality. We argue that the surprising fact indicates the existence of a 
grabbing hand of intermediate governments in China. We suspect that, in some 
regions, central grants may have been leaking and have not been used for the intended 
purposes. China is not alone in this case. As noted previously, Freinkman and 
Plekhanov (2009) find a similar problem with intermediate governments due to the 
distorted fiscal incentive structure in Russia, drawing on data between the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  
 
We need to pay attention to the role played by intermediate governments in the design 
of a well-functioning intergovernmental transfer system. Much scholarship in this 
area previously investigates the problem of grantors or recipient governments on 
intergovernmental transfers. Nevertheless, the role of intermediate governments in 
intergovernmental grants (flowing through them but not for them) receives scant 
attention in the literature. 
 
In line with the level-by-level administration system (World Bank, 2007), the central 
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grant in China goes through provincial governments before it reaches lower-level 
governments.
11
 Therefore, there is a risk that intermediate governments may retain 
the intergovernmental transfers for their self-interests. Our study suggests that, similar 
to some other developing countries, at least in transfer-dependent regions, provincial 
governments in China tend not to decentralize financial resources to grassroots 
governments though the latter needs substantial financial resources for public 
services.  
 
A predatory role of provincial governments in China was reported by other studies as 
well. Based on their empirical research of fiscal equalization in China, 
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2008) note that intermediate governments (provincial 
governments) play a de-equalizing role in closing the regional gap of fiscal capacity 
in China. Zhang (2009) documents that provincial governments in China retain some 
central grants inappropriately and prey on grassroots governments. Official accounts 
also suggest a predatory role of provincial governments in the Chinese 
intergovernmental system. The National Audit Office (2004) reported that only 22.5 
percent of central transfers actually appeared in provincial budget books in 2003 
though all transfers from higher authorities must have been included in the budget. As 
an explanation, Li Jinhua, the former Auditor-General of the Chinese central 
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government, once offered an intriguing metaphor for the Chinese intergovernmental 
transfer system: 
The intergovernmental transfer system in China is like a very long canal running 
from the central to the local governments. The canal is leaky, however (Wu, 2010, 
p.159).  
 
 
We try to gauge the reasons behind the role played by provincial governments. 
Parallel to Russia and other developing countries, the Chinese case demonstrates an 
intricate situation of fiscal games. Employing the data of Russia, Gimpelson and 
Treisman (2002) document fiscal games played by the national and sub-national 
governments wherein public employment and political patronage are key to 
understanding the distorted intergovernmental transfer system in Russia. On the one 
hand, local governments increased public employment beyond their own fiscal 
capacity for the purpose of asking for more central transfers. The national government, 
on the other hand, was willing to bail out some governments on the brink of public 
sector strikes related to pay arrears as politicians in Moscow fully understood the cost 
of strikes. 
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In the case of China, the bulk of budgetary expenditure has been spent on public 
sector employment (Gong &Wu, 2012). The centralization of expenditure in 
transfer-dependent regions in our study thus could probably be explained by 
bureaucratic expansion at the provincial level. Similar to other developing countries, 
transfer-dependent regions may rely on central transfers to expand their employees 
while the central government buys off these regions for political stability through 
substantial central transfers. Parallel to what happens in Russia, the situation in China 
calls local public governance into question.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The paper examines the determinants of fiscal decentralization and provides a 
snapshot of the dynamics of central transfers in China. The study complements 
Freinkman and Plekhanov’s (2009) findings on fiscal decentralization that regions 
relying more on central transfers tend to have a more centralized fiscal system within 
the region. Instead of only reporting the findings, we offer a tentative explanation for 
the negative relationship between transfer dependency and expenditure 
decentralization in China. That is, some intermediate governments might use central 
transfers to enhance the growth of public employment for their own interests. This 
study also contributes to our understanding of subnational fiscal decentralization in 
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developing economies. Drawing on data at the provincial, prefectural and county 
levels in China, it has generated empirical results that help to identify the 
determinants of China’s expenditure decentralization, and probably for other 
developing countries as well.  
 
The study suggests that an appropriate fiscal incentive structure for regional 
governments is needed. More importantly, an effective monitoring of intermediate 
governments is imperative especially in developing countries such as China. In the 
Western democracies, the strengthening of party leadership and the partisan link 
between the central and local governors may effectively prevent regional governments 
from preying on grassroots governments, despite some exceptions (Enikolopov & 
Zhuravskaya, 2007; Riker, 1964). Alternatively, appropriate administrative 
organizations (independent commissions) for regulating the intergovernmental system 
prove to be instrumental in holding local governments accountable to the principal in 
many countries (Sato, 2007; Shah, 2007). In contrast to practices in the Western 
context, the Chinese government actually attempts to use its unique nomenclature 
system to make regional governors comply with central mandates (Huang, 1996). The 
personnel control system nonetheless is not always effective as local governments 
often find ways to circumvent central control in reality. Based on this study, we 
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propose some preliminary measures to curb the predatory role of intermediate 
governments and improve the intergovernmental fiscal system in China.  
 
First, transparency in the intergovernmental system must be strengthened. It is 
paramount for the establishment of an effective transfer system in a country. The 
central government should disclose the information on fiscal transfers to the public.
12
 
The monitoring can also be strengthened by utilizing increasingly assertive congresses 
to exercise a check over intermediate governments. In a study of public accountability 
in Zhejiang Province in China, Hsu (2009) finds that local villages’ congresses can 
exert an effective check on government budgetary behavior in these areas. We argue 
that through empowering local congresses, both transparency and fiscal discipline 
may be improved to some extent.  
 
Second, the fiscal capacity of local governments must be enhanced. The World Bank 
(2007) argues that “[u]nder conditions of fiscal stress, the temptation for higher levels 
to ‘grab’ revenues is undoubtedly great” (p.42). In recent years, accompanying the 
Chinese economic miracle has been an exceptionally swelling central coffer. The 
central government’s rising fiscal capacity has not shown a strong trickle-down effect 
in local China, with subnational governments, especially county governments, striving 
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hard to keep their heads above water (Guo, 2008). Improving fiscal capacity at the 
local level thus is imperative in China.  
 
Third, the national government’s role should change from being a provider to an 
enabler. The era of relying on the central government efforts to promote economic 
development has faded away. Local governments have been key players in promoting 
economic development around the world (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2003). Recent years’ public 
governance theory puts greater emphasis on the enabler role of the national 
government. However, the central government in China has acted as the provider of 
both decision-making and financial resources for decades, which leads to the waste 
and leakage of public money and quite often cases of corruption in reality. Gap-filling 
transfers—aiming to improve the local capacity of providing public services, 
ironically, often result in increasing expenditure centralization within provinces, 
rather than better public service provision in some localities. Therefore, it is time to 
change the central government’s role from a financial provider to an enabler of a 
well-functioning intergovernmental system.  
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Table 1. Measurement and data source 
 
Variable  Measurement  Data source 
Fiscal 
decentralization  
Sub-provincial 
expenditure as a share 
of total provincial and 
sub-provincial 
expenditure 
Compendium of Fiscal 
Statistics for All Prefectures, 
Cities, and Counties 
(Quanguo dishixian caizheng 
tongji ziliao) 
Transfer 
dependency  
Central fiscal transfer 
as a share of total 
provincial and 
sub-provincial 
expenditure 
Finance Yearbook of China 
(zhongguo caizheng 
nianjian) 
Economic 
development 
Real GDP per capita (in 
natural logarithm) 
China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
Population 
density 
Inhabitant per sq. km 
(in natural logarithm) 
China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
Share of FDI in 
GDP 
FDI as a share of GDP China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
Share of trade in 
GDP 
Sum of imports and 
exports as a share of 
GDP 
China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
Share of SOE 
employment in 
population  
SOE employees as a 
share of the total 
population 
China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
Share of 
secondary sector 
in GDP 
The output of the 
secondary sector as a 
share of GDP 
China compendium of 
statistics 1949-2008 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (1995-2006) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Fiscal decentralization 0.71  0.10  0.44  0.89  360 
Transfer dependency 0.51  0.14  0.18  0.93  359 
Economic development 8.18  0.49  7.32  9.65  360 
Population density  5.34  1.23  1.93  7.73  360 
Share of FDI in GDP 0.04  0.04  0.00  0.24  360 
Share of Trade in GDP 0.27  0.34  0.03  1.75  360 
Share of SOE 
employment in population 
0.08  0.04  0.03  0.29  360 
Share of Secondary Sector 
in GDP 
0.45  0.07  0.20  0.62  360 
Note: Economic development and population density are in logarithms 
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Table 3. Determinants of fiscal decentralization (1995-2006) 
  
Model:  Linear 
 
Fractional probit 
Estimation method: Fixed effects 
 
2SLS 
 
Pooled QMLE 
  1 2   3 4   5 6 
Transfer dependency -0.164*** -0.156*** 
 
-0.178*** -0.169*** 
 
-0.158*** -0.159*** 
 
(0.037) (0.033) 
 
(0.032) (0.031) 
 
(0.058) (0.058) 
Economic development 0.064 0.071 
 
-0.062 -0.062 
 
-0.075 -0.092 
 
(0.073) (0.082) 
 
(0.101) (0.121) 
 
(0.097) (0.124) 
Population density  -0.320*** -0.316*** 
 
-0.223** -0.230** 
 
-0.174 -0.163 
 
(0.109) (0.107) 
 
(0.100) (0.101) 
 
(0.185) (0.197) 
Share of FDI in GDP -0.279** -0.270** 
 
-0.221** -0.203* 
 
-0.174 -0.165 
 
(0.116) (0.126) 
 
(0.092) (0.103) 
 
(0.204) (0.209) 
Share of Trade in GDP 0.035 0.039 
 
0.028 0.028 
 
0.035 0.034 
 
(0.027) (0.031) 
 
(0.022) (0.026) 
 
(0.039) (0.039) 
Share of SOE employment in population 
 
0.074 
  
-0.019 
 
0.016 0.004 
  
(0.194) 
  
(0.185) 
 
(0.313) (0.316) 
Share of Secondary Sector in GDP 
 
-0.085 
  
-0.074 
 
-0.065 -0.063 
  
(0.066) 
  
(0.066) 
 
(0.104) (0.105) 
R-squared 0.52 0.53 
 
0.51 0.51 
   
N 359 359   359 359   359 359 
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Notes: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
2) Economic development and population density are in logarithms. 
3) In models 3-4 and 6, the economic development variable is treated as endogenous. 
4) The standard errors, in parentheses, in the linear models are robust HAC standard errors. Those in fractional probit models were obtained 
using 1,000 bootstrap replications. 
5) All models contain year dummies for 1996 through 2006.  
6) The APEs are reported for fractional probit models; those for the time averages of the explanatory variables are not included in the table.  
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1
 Mogues and Benin (2012) in a study of local public finance in Ghana find that central grants tend to 
discourage the generation of local own revenue. 
2
 In addition, studies on flypaper effect indicate that an increase in lump-sum intergovernmental grants 
stimulates much more spending by lower-level governments than an equivalent increase in individual 
disposable incomes (Bailey and Connolly, 1998). 
3
 Much of the literature has so far used subnational expenditure or revenue as a share of national 
expenditure or revenue to measure fiscal decentralization. However, many point out that budgetary 
shares are imperfect indicators for measuring the real fiscal autonomy of local governments (Ebel & 
Yilmaz, 2003; Uchimura & Jütting, 2009). Non-fiscal measures therefore appear in some recent 
literature (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2003). 
4
 According to Greene (2000), measurement error of the dependent variable can be absorbed in the 
regression error term and thus be ignored, as long as the independent variable is measured properly in 
the model (Stegarescu, 2005). 
5
 The central government in China channels fiscal transfers to provincial governments, while the latter 
allocates them to lower levels of government. It does not deal with sub-provincial governments directly 
with respect to fiscal issues. 
6
 As indicated below, we adopt fixed effects models for the empirical analysis. Thus we cannot include 
both population size and population density in the estimation, as the denominator for the calculation of 
population density, i.e. provincial land area, is time-invariant. 
7
 Several studies document that fiscal decentralization has an impact on economic development. For 
example, Lin and Liu (2000) report that fiscal decentralization contributes positively to economic 
development in China.  
8
 The results of the likelihood-ratio test for heteroskedasticity (LR chi2(29) = 184.49, Prob > chi2 =    
0.00) and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (F(1, 29) = 66.929, Prob > F = 0.00) indicate the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation.  
9
 The model was estimated with the xtivreg2 procedure in STATA (Schaffer, 2005). The weak 
instrument test compares the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic to critical values established by Stock and 
Yogo (2005). While this comparison is not technically correct due to non-i.i.d. errors, Baum, Schaffer, 
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and Stillman (2007) argue that this is a reasonable approximation. In the model, the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
statistic is well above any critical values established by Stock and Yogo (2005). In addition, the Sargan 
statistic in the over identification test indicates that all instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the 
model (Hayashi, 2000).  
10
 When we dropped the four centrally direct-controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing) from the analysis, the major results remained unchanged.  
11
 The province-managing-county (shengguanxian) reform implemented in recent years has intended 
to mitigate the transmission problem of central and provincial grants at the prefectural level, which is 
beyond the scope of this research. 
12
 Martinez-Vazquez and Qiao (2011) also advocate horizontal accountability mechanisms to be put in 
place wherein residents can have a say over public finance in China.   
 
